INTRODUCTION
Indiana constitutional law evolved significantly over the thirty years Justice Brent E. Dickson served on the Indiana Supreme Court, and he is as responsible for that evolution as any other single person. Put another way, no other individual had more to do with the development of Indiana constitutional law since the1980s than Justice Dickson.
His influence can be seen across constitutional law-freedom of religion, freedom of speech, double jeopardy, search and seizure, equal privileges and immunities, the Special Laws Clauses, the Open Courts Clause, and many other aspects of Indiana constitutional law. His contributions have been in both 1 majority opinions and dissents, some of which have later been adopted as the majority view. Other articles in this festschrift will address Justice Dickson's contributions to the law of freedom of religion as well as both constitutional and non-constitutional aspects of tort law and criminal law. This Article bats clean-up on the constitutional issues not addressed by the other authors, although it does not purport to cover every Dickson-influenced state constitutional decision.
I. THE INTERPRETIVE STANDARD
Over and above the individual decisions, Justice Dickson has had as much influence as anyone on the standard the Indiana Supreme Court has adopted over the last thirty years to determine the meaning of the Indiana Constitution, what this Article refers to as the "interpretive standard. ** Jon Laramore is executive director of Indiana Legal Services, Inc., a statewide non-profit law firm providing civil legal aid to low-income Hoosiers. He was previously a partner at Faegre Baker Daniels, LLP; counsel to Indiana Governors Joseph Kernan and Frank O'Bannon; a deputy attorney general in Indiana and Massachusetts; and a legal aid attorney. A graduate of Harvard Law School, the Harvard Kennedy School, and Princeton University, he has taught state constitutional law at Indiana University McKinney School of Law and is a member and former president of the Indiana Board of Law Examiners. The author thanks Janice E. Kreuscher and Daniel E. Pulliam for their thoughtful comments on a draft of this Article.
1. Although contrary to the usual style of this law review, this Article capitalizes the names of certain constitutional clauses in this Article because doing so promotes clarity. Professor Eric Posner expanded this analysis, explaining why originalism is not value-free: "[O]riginalism does not enable justices to decide cases neutrally. If they choose to adopt this methodology, and manage to figure out a way to make it constrain them, they are committed to enforcing mostly 18 -century th values-which are, by definition, conservative." Eric Posner concluded that 10 originalism cannot resolve interpretive issues because "historical sources are rarely clear" and originalism does not dictate "how broadly constitutional principles like 'due process' and 'equal protection' should be understood." U.S.
11
Supreme Court justices have echoed these points, noting there is no objective, neutral answer to questions such as what historical sources count, how much weight to give them, and how to resolve conflicts between them. 12 Originalism also has been criticized as an inappropriate method for constitutional analysis, especially for analysis of rights-giving clauses, because the drafters purposely chose broad, expansive language and thereby intentionally gave future interpreters-including the courts-leeway to give language meaning. Justice Stevens voiced this criticism, stating that originalism is 13 inimical to the framers' emphasis on expansive individual rights. In essence, 14 analyzing rights from the framers' standpoint means that the rights may be applied only to circumstances within the framers' worldview and frustrates an expansive approach in new circumstances. Justice Stevens wrote that originalism "is unfaithful to the expansive principle Americans laid down when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the level of generality they chose when they crafted its language." He also criticized originalism as value-laden, saying that 15 "it promises an objectivity it cannot deliver and masks the value judgments that pervade any analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are sufficiently 'rooted'; [and] it countenances the most revolting injustices in the name of continuity." 16 Critics of originalism have pointed out that if originalism-in the sense of the drafters' "intended outcome"-had been the sole measuring stick, neither , applied a kind of originalist interpretive standard (even using the formulation "the old law, the mischief, and the remedy," id. at 334, as is used now) to uphold the constitutionality of the Indiana statute permitting racial segregation in common schools. The court first concluded that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend it to reach schools at all. Id. at 352-53 (relying on The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), and State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871)). It then concluded that when the framers of article 8, section 1 spoke of a "uniform system of common schools" that is "equally open to all," their words are "not to be taken in a literal sense," id. at 334, 359, but rather the Indiana Constitution permits the General Assembly to set conditions, including race, on school attendance. After reviewing those cases, Justice Dickson concluded in Collins that the Indiana Constitution's provision was different from equal protection and required a different analysis, basing his conclusion on the linguistic differences between the state and federal provisions and the line of Indiana cases applying a different analysis.
31
Attempting to determine "the common understanding of both those who framed . . . [the 1851 Constitution] and those who ratified it," the opinion next examined the history surrounding the adoption of the provision and concluded that section 23 was intended "to prohibit the state legislature from affirmatively granting any exclusive privilege or immunity involving the state's participation in commercial enterprise." In particular, the drafters were concerned with the 32 monopolistic contracts and loans previously given to companies that built public works, such as canals, a practice that led to the financial ruin that precipitated the 1850 Constitutional Convention.
33
The court then looked at how this principle had been applied in cases over the years. Justice Dickson analyzed more than two dozen cases that applied the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause between 1886 and 1974, discerning from these cases a standard, not previously articulated, that goes beyond the drafters' specific intent. As he put it, 34 where the legislature singles out one person or class of persons to receive a privilege or immunity not equally provided to others, such 27. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 23 ("The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.").
28 recited the Collins standard and approved the IHSAA rule, finding a "reasonable relationship" between the rule and its purposes.
46
Justice Dickson disagreed, finding no basis to differentiate between families' school choices based on athletics and families' school choices based on "nonathletic areas of education; such as, computer technology, foreign language, drama and performing arts, interscholastic debate competition, and marching band." To Justice Dickson, parents across the state routinely made decisions 47 about their children's schooling that were calculated to improve their children's circumstances, sometimes including decisions about which schools had better athletic programs. He could see no basis allowable under section 23 to penalize 48 some families for their school choices related to athletics while not penalizing all other families that made school choices for non-athletic reasons-thus, the rule was "not justified by any inherent difference between the two classes of persons." 
52
The court ruled 3-2, in an opinion by Justice Dickson, that the disparate treatment accorded the casino was not reasonably related to inherent differences between the casino and taverns and clubs in Evansville, meaning that it violated the Collins standard and was unconstitutional. The ordinance itself identified 53 protecting public health as its purpose, but the city defended the ordinance primarily by arguing that the casino produced significant revenue for the city and did so mainly by drawing customers from outside Evansville.
54
The majority found the city had shown insufficient differences between the taverns and clubs, on one hand, and the casino, on the other, to treat them differently: "the enactment provides an unequal privilege that is not reasonably related to the inherent distinguishing characteristics of the two affected groups." while the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause was drafted to preclude providing special benefits to a single business, Evansville did precisely that by giving the casino special treatment in return for expected economic benefits for the city. Indianapolis justified its disparate treatment of the satellite gambling facility differently than Evansville. Indianapolis pointed not to the revenue it received, 63 but instead Indianapolis explained in detail that-unlike taverns-the satellite gambling facility was subject to extensive state regulation, including a requirement that the facility provide detailed plans for expelling tobacco smoke, and that those plans were evaluated and approved by the state. The court found 64 that a satellite gambling facility could not exist without complying with the state regulation requiring detailed plans for smoke removal, "which thus makes [the provision] an inherent characteristic of such a facility." Because this state 65 licensing requirement was the basis for the smoking ban exemption, Indianapolis based the exemption on an inherent difference.
66
The court also ruled that the different treatment was reasonably related to the inherent difference, another Collins requirement. To obtain the state license, the 67 satellite gambling facility had to obtain state approval of its smoke removal and other climate control system, allowing the state regulatory body to consider the 
B. Article 10, Section 1
Likely the most consequential of Justice Dickson's state constitutional decisions are the Town of St. John cases, which applied the language in article 10, section 1 requiring that "the General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation and shall prescribe regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal." The Town of St. John, in Lake County, sued the State Board of Tax   70 Commissioners on behalf of some of its citizens, claiming that the state-mandated system local officials used to assess property for taxation purposes failed to satisfy the constitutional commands that it be "uniform and equal" and provide "just valuation." The town argued that the system was skewed in favor of some 71 classes of taxpayers and against others. The case was handled at the trial level 72 by the Indiana Tax Court, and the Indiana Supreme Court ultimately heard three separate appeals, two of which are relevant to the discussion of Justice Dickson's state constitutional jurisprudence.
73
In the 1996 appeal, the State Board of Tax Commissioners argued that plaintiffs raised no justiciable issue because article 10, section 1 was a guide for the legislature that lacked any standards capable of judicial application. The 74 plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the Indiana Constitution commanded that only one approach to valuation-pure fair market valuation-would satisfy the standards in article 10, section 1. Article 10, Section 1, was to specifically require uniform and equal assessment and taxation, and just valuation." He noted that the language was "aspirational" 79 because perfect fairness could never be achieved. Nevertheless, he wrote, the 80 constitutional language and circumstances surrounding the adoption of article 10 "clearly demonstrate that the framers did not intend to give the legislature unrestrained discretion as to the laws of assessment and taxation." Rather, the 81 courts had authority to enforce the constitutional standards.
82
The court also rejected the argument that only pure fair market value assessments would satisfy the constitutional standard. The court stated that the 83 purpose of article 10 was "that each taxpayer's property wealth bear its proportion of the overall property tax burden," but nothing in the constitutional 84 language suggested that there was only one assessment method that would satisfy the constitutional command, as illustrated by a number of prior cases applying the constitutional language. The court remanded the case to the Tax Court to apply 85 the standard enunciated in its opinion.
86
The Tax Court did so, ruling in 1997 that Indiana's assessment rules violated article 10 and requiring the State Board of Tax Commissioners to consider all competent evidence when it adjudicated assessment appeals. The case then 87 returned to the Indiana Supreme Court for the 1998 decision, where the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. 88 In an approach echoed in other Dickson opinions, the court held that article 10, section 1, created no "personal right of absolute uniformity and equality in assessment rate. system that achieves the overall effect of uniformity and equality. Section 1 90 does, however, mandate "that the assessment system must be based on objectively verifiable data to enable a review of the assessment system to ensure uniformity and equality, and to ensure that individual taxpayers have a means to assert a personal 'right of uniformity and equality' as to individual assessments." The 91 Indiana Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Tax Court's command that Indiana's assessment system must be based on objectively verifiable data "to enable review of the system to assure that it generally provides uniformity and equality based on property wealth."
92
Contrary to the Tax Court's decision, however, Justice Dickson's opinion gave the state leeway to prescribe different assessment methods for different types of property so long as the classifications of property types are "based upon differences naturally inhering in the property." The Supreme Court's opinion 93 expressly permits valuation based on the actual use of property rather than its "highest and best" use. This approach allows, for example, land used for 94 farming to be taxed as farm land rather than at the (often higher) value the land would command if it were sold for residential development. Applying these standards, the court invalidated Indiana's existing valuation schedules because, as the Tax Court ruled, the schedules were not based on objective evidence of property wealth. It additionally rejected the Tax Court's conclusion that 95 property owners had a constitutional right to require assessing authorities to consider all evidence of property wealth; rather, because no individual had a constitutional right to a perfect assessment, state law could limit what types of evidence of property wealth had to be considered in the assessing process. 96 The impact of these decisions is difficult to understate. After the decision, the General Assembly received information showing that if the decision were implemented without any other change in the law, some taxpayers-particularly homeowners, and especially those with older homes-would experience significantly increased tax bills, sometimes increases of multiples of three, four, or more. As a result, the General Assembly restructured Indiana's entire tax 97 system, increasing the sales tax from 5% to 6%, more than tripling the cigarette tax, and using that new revenue to replace some of the revenue raised from legislation, the General Assembly installed for the first time a referendum system requiring voter approval of certain local government capital projects.
104
Additional pressure for taxpayer protection later in the 2000's led the General Assembly to create tax caps, limiting the property tax payment to a specified percentage of assessed valuation, initially 1.5% for homesteads, 2.5% for other residential property and farm land, and 3.5% for business property. The caps 105 later were decreased to 1% for homesteads, 2% for other residential and farm land, and 3% for business property, and these caps were enacted as a constitutional amendment in 2010. 
A. Access to Courts
Justice Dickson led the court in re-invigorating the public standing doctrine, which allows a plaintiff to sue to enforce a public duty even when the plaintiff lacks a special stake in the outcome of a case that differs from all other members of the general public. One of the first times he gave voice to this view was in 108 his dissent in Pence v. State, in which a group of taxpayers sued to stop what they viewed as an unconstitutional legislative pay increase. In a terse opinion, the 109 Indiana Supreme Court voted 4-1 to reject the challenge on standing grounds, holding that the plaintiffs had no standing either as citizens or as taxpayers because they could show no direct injury different than that suffered by any other citizen.
110
Justice Dickson dissented, opining that the taxpayer-plaintiffs had standing both statutorily and under the public standing doctrine, which in his view gave plaintiffs "a right to challenge allegedly unconstitutional and illegal conduct of state officials . . . 
113
Justice Dickson won a majority for this view of standing in the Cittadine case, a landmark of standing law rooted in a local dispute over whether the state had failed to enforce a statute requiring maintenance of a clear view at a railroad grade crossing. Justice Dickson opened the opinion by acknowledging that to 114 have standing in most situations, a plaintiff must show direct injury or immediate danger of direct injury from the complained-of conduct.
115
His opinion then reviewed cases decided by the Indiana courts beginning in 1852 that created the public standing doctrine, which eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff show direct injury or immediate danger of direct injury when the plaintiff is seeking enforcement of a public duty or challenging certain government actions. He restated the principle underlying these decisions: 116 The public standing doctrine, which applies in cases where public rather than private rights are at issue and in cases which involve the enforcement of a public rather than a private right, continues to be a viable exception to the general standing requirement. The public standing doctrine permits the assertion of all proper legal challenges, including claims that government action is unconstitutional.
117
In such circumstances, a plaintiff need not establish unique injury because the requirement that a plaintiff have an injury different from that experienced by the general public is abrogated. The court clarified that the public standing doctrine 118 does not diminish the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies or the application of statutory limitations such as the Public Lawsuit Act.
119
But Justice Dickson's jurisprudence does not favor an entirely open door for litigation over public disputes; to the contrary, he has invoked other limits on judicial authority to preclude presentation of certain claims.
In Berry v.
120
Crawford, he wrote the majority opinion holding that the judiciary could not adjudicate a dispute between members of the minority and majority caucuses of the House of Representatives arising from a minority walkout. The minority 121 sued when the majority fined the minority as discipline for the walkout and withheld the fines from their pay.
122
No judicial remedy was available for the minority, the court held, because the separation of powers doctrine precluded relief.
The Indiana Constitution 123 explicitly empowered the legislative branch to enact the rules that were the basis for the fines imposed on absent legislators, to compel the attendance of absent members, and to punish members for disorderly behavior. Justice Dickson 124 wrote:
[T]he constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the legislature over its internal proceedings and the discipline of its members is exclusive. Sections 10, 11, and 14 of Article 4 represent an express constitutional commitment to the legislature. Absent any further express constitutional limitation or qualification on this grant of authority, the plaintiffs' claims are nonjusticiable.
125
This was true, the majority wrote, despite the fact that the legislature itself had passed statutes, like the Wage Payment Statutes, that at least arguably 117. Id. at 983. On the merits, the court rejected Cittadine's challenge under the statute requiring a clear view of a railroad grade crossing from a certain distance and found his claim moot because the underlying statute had been changed during the time his lawsuit was pending. echoing Justice Dickson's reasoning in the Town of St. John cases, they restrict the scope of the constitutional right that a citizen may enforce-the right to free public education in Bonner, and the right to treatment in a juvenile correctional 131 facility in Ratliff.
132
In Bonner, a group of public school students sued state officials, claiming that various state actions and policies deprived them of free, quality, public education guaranteed by article 8, section 1. The court parsed the text of this provision 133 and held that it "speaks only of a general duty to provide for a system of common schools and does not require the attainment of any standard of resulting educational quality." In other words, the Indiana Constitution "says nothing 134 whatsoever about educational quality."
Because the Indiana Constitution 135 imposed no quality standard, the courts could not enforce one, and the plaintiffs had no cause of action.
136
In Ratliff, a juvenile who had been convicted of a serious crime claimed a The court scoured the debates at the constitutional convention and found "no historical evidence of contemporaneous public expectation that the new constitution was intended to prohibit the incarceration of any and every juvenile offender in an adult prison."
139
This line of reasoning shows the power of the interpretive standard discussed in Part I above. In short, the court asked not whether any overriding constitutional purpose, social science evidence, pragmatic reasoning, experience about how individuals are best rehabilitated, or even contemporary sensibilities suggested that juvenile prisoners should be held separate from adults; it asked only whether those who wrote the Indiana Constitution in 1850 and certain statutes passed immediately afterward insisted on that separation. Based on this reasoning, the 140 court ruled that while the constitution required that institutions for juvenile incarceration be created, it vested no individual right that any particular juvenile be housed in such an institution.
141
Justice Dickson also authored a unanimous opinion precluding access to the courts by prisoners seeking review of internal prison disciplinary decisions in Zimmerman v. State. Despite the Open Courts Clause and the settled principle 142 of Indiana law that a party is entitled to one judicial appeal of an administrative action, the court rejected Zimmerman's effort to appeal a prison administrator's decision to restrict his visitation privileges for disciplinary reasons. 147 The modern doctrine of the Special Laws Clauses developed over several cases, starting with Indiana Gaming Commission v. Moseley, which upheld the constitutionality of the statute allowing riverboat gaming but limited riverboat gaming to certain locations, namely communities along Lake Michigan, the Ohio River, and Patoka Lake. The court analyzed the statute first under section 22, 148 which prohibits special laws in seventeen enumerated categories, finding that the law allowing riverboat gaming fell into none of those categories and was therefore not prohibited by section 22. It then analyzed the statute under section 149 23, which prohibits special laws "where a general law can be made applicable" and ruled that the statute did not violate section 23 because a special law was necessary to limit gaming to locales that would support gaming on boats. 150 Moseley should have ended forever the canard that the Indiana Constitution prohibits special laws: it prohibits only some special laws.
Justice Dickson's Hoovler decision followed two years later and further developed the law under both sections 22 and 23. In Hoovler, taxpayers sued 151 over a special law that allowed Tippecanoe County to enact a tax to fund cleanup of a landfill. The court first determined that the statute did not violate section instructs that every word of the Indiana Constitution is to be read with care.
155
Doing so, the court concluded the statute did not offend section 22 because it was not a special law for the assessment of taxes (that is, how to value property) because it did not prescribe special assessing methods for any location; nor was it a special law for the collection of taxes because it would be collected just like taxes in all other counties. The statute permitted an increase in only the tax rate, 156 and that action is not on the list of prohibited special laws in section 22.
157
Following Moseley, Hoovler also concluded that the special law did not violate section 23 because special conditions in Tippecanoe County permitted the General Assembly to treat that county differently. The trial court had made a 158 finding that Tippecanoe County was the only county in Indiana that faced cleanup of a landfill that-under the applicable federal Superfund environmental law-would be paid for by a state university, a county, and a municipality. The 159 court concluded that it was appropriate to allow the special tax rate, which was necessary to fund a settlement that had been arrived at to clean up the landfill, rather than requiring lengthy, expensive litigation under the Superfund law. 160 Another important element of Hoovler is its footnote 3. The opinion notes 161 that the legislature identified Tippecanoe County not by name, but rather by its population: a county "having a population of more than one hundred twenty-nine thousand (129,000) but less than one hundred thirty-thousand six hundred (130,600)," with Tippecanoe County being the only county with a population falling within these parameters.
The court stated that it would determine 162 whether a law is special (that is, applies only in one or a very small number of locations) not by the manner in which the legislature designates the location, but by the actual effect of the legislation. Despite some earlier cases that could be 163 read to the contrary, designating the locations by population limits does not convert an otherwise special law into a general and uniform law. When the legislature seeks to address a special or local problem that cannot be resolved through the use of a general law, the General Assembly may enact a special law plainly designating its intended beneficiary and without employing the subterfuge of population limits, so long as it does not violate the strictures of Article IV, § 22. conviction for disorderly conduct arising from Price's shouted and sometimes profane comments about police conduct while she was being arrested. The 167 majority ruled that Price's conduct was constitutionally protected political speech about police conduct, a public issue, and that political speech was a "core value" under article 1, section 9 of the Indiana Constitution that was "materially burdened" by Price's conviction. The majority vacated her conviction after 168 determining, on the facts of this particular case, that her constitutional right to free expression outweighed the privacy interests of others subjected to her noise. But the General Assembly's own actions undermined this approach. The legislature mandated the use of decennial census populations to determine which localities fit into any given population range and, after each new census, the General Assembly enacted a bill that changed all the population ranges in all affected statutes so that only the same localities as had previously been covered by those special laws remained in those categories as identified by the new census numbers despite population changes. 
